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Abstract—Smart distribution networks shall improve the
efficiency and reliability of power distribution by intelligently
managing the available power and requested load. Such
intelligent power networks pose challenges for information
and communication technology (ICT). Their design requires
a holistic assessment of traditional power system topology
and ICT architecture. Existing analysis approaches focus on
analyzing the power networks components separately. For
example, communication simulation provides failure data for
communication links, while power analysis makes predictions
about the stability of the traditional power grid. However, these
insights are not combined to provide a basis for design decisions
for future smart distribution networks.
In this paper, we describe a common model-driven analysis
framework for smart distribution networks based on the Com-
mon Information Model (CIM). This framework provides scal-
able analysis of large smart distribution networks by support-
ing analyses on different levels of abstraction. Furthermore, we
apply our framework to holistic survivability analysis. We map
the CIM on a survivability model to enable assessing design
options with respect to the achieved survivability improvement.
We demonstrate our approach by applying the mapping
transformation in a case study based on a real distribution
circuit. We conclude by evaluating the survivability impact of
three investment options.
Keywords-Distribution Automation, Modeling, Model-to-
Model Transformation, Smart-Grid, Common Information
Model, Survivability, Design Decisions
I. INTRODUCTION
Power engineers are currently designing future intelligent
power distribution networks. To assess these designs, they
need to consider the interactions between several relevant
domains such as electrical power flow, telecommunications,
distribution network topology, demand side management,
and failure detection, isolation, and restoration.
The Common Information Model (CIM) [2], [1] is an
IEC-standardized model of power networks, capturing in-
formation about topology, power distribution, loads etc. to
support interoperability of energy management systems.
In this paper, we present (1) a software engineering
framework based on the CIM to support the design of future
intelligent power distribution networks and (2) an application
of this framework to holistic survivability analysis.
We propose a common analysis framework that employs
transformations from CIM to the several models required
to perform the holistic analysis of the smart distribution
network. Specifically, the power engineer will be provided
with an immediate-feedback tool to edit and view the current
state and associated metrics of a smart distribution network
design. The design will be expressed as a CIM model that
will interface to several specific analysis models.
To show the applicability of our approach, we describe
its application to survivability analysis. We use a high-
level model for holistic survivability analysis of failure
detection, isolation, and restoration scenarios and sketch how
low-level analysis results from detailed communications,
power flow equations, and demand response analysis will
be integrated. The high-level survivability model uses the
electrical properties of the distribution automation topology
for state aggregation and thus can be used to analyze large
models efficiently.
In this paper, we consider the software engineering aspects
that need to be considered for the proposed scalable distribu-
tion automation assessment framework. The proposed design
takes advantage of analysis decomposition and separation of
concerns to support the required modelling scalability while
integrating the detailed communication, power, and demand
response analysis results into a holistic assessment provided
by the high-level survivability model.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
Scalable analysis framework for holistic power sys-
tems design: We describe a common model-driven analysis
framework that supports holistic design by integrating high
level analysis methods with low-level, detailed analyses.
In particular, we present a case study of the interactions
between communication reliability, power system topology,
and demand response behaviour in failure detection, iso-
lation, and restoration scenarios. Engineers can use our
approach to quantitatively evaluate design options.
Mapping of CIM models to survivability models: We
present a mapping from CIM to a holistic survivability
model. Our mapping considers power system topology, load
information, available power information, demand response
behaviour of customers, and communication infrastructure.
The implementation of the proposed framework as well as
the mapping of detailed communication, power and demand
response analysis results is subject to future work.
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Figure 1. Envisioned Common Analysis Framework for Smart Distribution Networks
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II sketches
our envisioned common model-driven analysis framework
for smart distribution networks. In Section III we present
the smart failure detection, isolation, and restoration scenario
and briefly describe the survivability model we build upon.
In Section IV we describe the mapping of CIM models to the
survivability model. In Section V we present our case study,
which is based on a real distribution circuit, and describe
how investment options can be supported by our analysis
framework. In Section VI we present related literature before
Section VII concludes.
II. A COMMON MODEL-DRIVEN ANALYSIS
FRAMEWORK FOR SMART DISTRIBUTION GRIDS
This section introduces a common analysis framework
for smart distribution grids. It states basic requirements,
describes our proposed conceptual approach, and finally
sketches the planned technical realization. Multiple chal-
lenging requirements drive our common analysis framework:
User-friendliness: The framework shall enable engineers
to express the information necessary for the analyses in
an easy to learn format, ideally having illustrative and
intuitive graphical model editors. The sophisticated analysis
formalisms and tools shall remain transparent from the
engineers, thus relieving them to deal with specific expert
knowledge. Therefore, an automated feedback mechanism
shall map the analysis results (e.g., reliability or survivability
metrics) back to the graphical input notation.
Extensibility: Due to new possibilities emerging from
the smart-grid distribution networks, the analysis framework
shall be easily extensible for new analysis methods.
Scalability: As complex smart-grid distribution networks
complicate sophisticated analysis methods and might even
make detailed analysis infeasible due to state space ex-
plosion of the underlying models, the framework shall
provide some mechanism to scale with complex distribution
networks. Moreover, it shall be easy-to-use even for large
models and shall not require manual interaction to transform
the CIM model into the specific analysis languages.
Reuse of existing assets: Many analysis method and
tools have already been implemented and shall be reused
to not loose the expert knowledge encapsulated in their
implementation.
To meet these requirements, we propose the conceptual
approach illustrated in Fig. 1. The power engineers model
the distribution circuit under study based on a common
model, including information required for the analysis. Then,
they can request a specific analysis (e.g., survivability,
communication simulation, power flow, demand-response)
directly from the tool. The transformation to the required
analysis model and analysis algorithm execute in the back-
ground. Finally, our approach reports the results back into
the original common model as annotations.
The approach is user-friendly as the user only needs to
deal with a single notation and does not need to be aware
of details of the underlying analysis methods. To further
improve the usability of the approach, it offers textual and
graphical editors for the common model.
The approach is extensible as it allows to implement
transformations from the common model into future analysis
models that provide novel analysis capabilities. Thus, for
each new analysis method a transformation from common
model into the specific language used for the analysis is
required. If the common model does not contain required
information, it is extended by adding new metamodel el-
ements, which is transparent to the other transformations.
As such, the extension of provided analysis methods is
independent from other already integrated methods.
To be scalable the approach allows to feed results from
different analysis approaches into one another. Thus, results
from analysis methods on lower abstraction levels can be
condensed and then used on higher abstraction levels to
analyze complex systems. For example, the result from low-
level reliability simulation of a single communication link
can be annotated to the common model as a failure proba-
bility, which is used by the transformation to the high-level
survivability model. Because of this decomposition of the
analyses, state space explosion is avoided and system-wide
properties on a higher abstraction level can be analyzed.
Finally, the approach is designed to reuse existing assets;
existing analysis models and tools can be connected via
model transformations from the common model. This way,
our approach allows easy reuse of existing tools through
their integration as one of the backend analysis methods.
We plan the technical realization of our conceptual ap-
proach based on a number of existing technologies. The
model edited by the users will be based on the CIM. Because
the CIM models many aspects of power systems, it unifies
the information required by different analyses, and thus
serves as good foundation for our analysis framework. CIM
models can also be imported and exported by several power
analysis tools from ABB and Siemens [6], thus facilitating
the reuse of existing tools. However, because the CIM does
not yet support all concepts needed for smart grids [8], it
possibly needs to be extended for some analyses, such as
the analysis of demand response application.
III. FOUNDATIONS: SCENARIO AND ANALYSIS
This section briefly describes the smart failure detection,
isolation, and restoration scenario (III-A) and the existing
holistic survivability analysis (III-B). For more detail on the
distribution automation challenges, we refer to [7].
A. Failure Isolation and Restoration
To convey our envisioned approach, we focus on a future
failure isolation and restoration scenario in smart sectio-
nalized circuits, described in the following. Fig. 2 shows
a distribution circuit that is sectionalized into 7 sections.
Between the sections, reclosers can interrupt the connection
if a failure in an adjacent section is detected.
In normal operation, a circuit is powered by a dedicated
substation. In our figure, sections S1 to S7 are powered by
subsection Sb1 in normal operation. If a failure occurs in a
section i, the downstream sections can quickly be recovered
by isolating them from the faulty section and powering them
from the normal substation (green in Fig. 2).
If a backup substation is connected to the other end of the
circuit and has enough available spare power, the distribution
automation can restore the upstream sections (red in Fig. 2).
If the backup power does not suffice, demand response might
be called for to reduce the requested load so that backup
power suffices. Signals (price signals or mandatory control
signals) will be sent to smart meters at the energy consumers,
which can switch off non-critical devices, such as fridges or
air conditioning for a while.
B. Survivability Model
To predict the survivability of a distribution circuit as
described in the previous subsection, we build upon a
holistic survivability analysis model [3]. It takes into account
Sb1 Sb2S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
Substation Backup substation
Tie switchFailed section
Downstream
sections
Upstream
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Closed recloser Open recloser
Figure 2. Failure Isolation and Restoration in Sectionalized Circuits
Table I
SURVIVABLITY MODEL PARAMETERS FROM [3]
Parameter Description
p probability that communication works after failure
q probability that backup power suffices to supply
isolated sections
r probability that demand response is effective after failure
ENS{hs energy not supplied per hour for model state s
 communication repair rate in events/hour
the topology of the distribution circuit, the communication
availability, and the demand response capabilities.
Table I shows the input parameters of the survivability
model. The model takes as an input the probabilities that
communication is available p, that backup power is sufficient
q, and that demand response is effective r, as well as
the duration to repair communication as a rate  and the
measure “energy not supplied” for each of the model states.
The model states and transitions reflect the behaviour of
the system after a fault. Initially, all sections upstream
of the failure are without power, then, depending on the
availability and the communication, the upstream sections
may recover with different rates. Eventually, the system
completely recovers if the cause of the section failure is
manually repaired. The survivability can be calculated in
terms of the “accumulated energy not supplied up to full
system recovery metric (AENS).
IV. MAPPING THE CIM TO SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS
In this work, we show the feasibility of our approach by
mapping a subset of the CIM to the survivability analysis.
In Section IV-A, we describe the subset of the CIM required
to model the power system topology. Section IV-B sketches
how the load data is modelled. The mapping of the cho-
sen CIM model elements to the model parameters of the
survivability analysis are described in Section IV-C.
A. Relevant CIM Subset
In this work, we use CIM concepts from the core
standard IEC 61970-301:2011 [2] (UML model version
13v19, packages Core, Topology, Wires, SCADA,
Meas) and the extension for distribution management, IEC
61968-11:2010(E) [1] (UML model version 10v31, pack-
age Assets) as available from IEC. Additionally, we
use the yet unstable Informative::InfAssets::-
ReliabilityInfo concept, which is available in the IEC
61968-11 UML model version 10v31 [4] but not described
in the official IEC publication.
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Figure 3. Case Study CIM Model (Simplified View)
To convey the relevant subset of the CIM, Figure 3
shows the CIM model of a distribution circuit between two
substations (also used later in our case study, Section V).
The used model elements are explained in the figure’s
key and in more detail on the accompanying website1.
In between the Substations, the distribution circuit
is assumed to be a sequence of sections separated by
Breakers (i.e. reclosers). Within a section, any type of
other Core::ConductingEquipment can be placed:
ConductingEquipment is the superclass for “parts of
the power system that are designed to carry current or
that are conductively connected therewith” [2], for example
Wires::ACLineSegments, which represent cables, or
LoadModel::ConformLoads. The lower right of Fig. 3
shows an example section with two industrial customers.
In the CIM, communication links are represented
by SCADA::RemoteUnits and SCADA::Communi-
cationLinks. One RemoteUnit models the cen-
tral control unit (remoteUnitType = ControlCenter).
For this work, we express the reliability of the com-
munication with the Informative::InfAssets::-
ReliabilityInfo concept. A ReliabilityInfo an-
notates any asset with a failure rate (as expected number of
failures per year momFailureRate) and a mean time to
repair (in hours as mTTR). This reliability information could
be derived, for example, by running detailed communication
simulations for a communication link.
B. Load information
The load information is assumed to be aggregated per
section. For each time of the day t for a given day type
d (e.g. Sundays in winter), the amount of power requested
by all consumers in a section i need to be imported into
the CIM model. In Fig. 3, the load model of each section
1http://sdqweb.ipd.kit.edu/wiki/Smart Distribution/SE4SG/CIM Subset
Customer1:
ConformLoad
Customer1LoadModel:
ConformLoadGroup
Customer1
SummerWeekday:
ConformLoadSchedule
Value1Unit = kW
Customer1
WinterWeekend:
ConformLoadSchedule
Value1Unit = kW
Summer
:Season Winter
:Season
Weekday
:DayType Weekend
:DayType
8h
:RegularTimePoint
Value1 = 47
9h
:RegularTimePoint
Value1 = 75
Regular time points for
schedule...
...
Electrically
connected to
section
Figure 4. Load Model Example
is simplified and shown as a histogram for one day type
for section S1, and is even further aggregated for the other
sections for brevity. Figure 4 shows a more detailed CIM
model with load information. In the following, we denote
this total load of a section i at time t of day type d with a
function of day and time Lipt; dq.
Additionally, the share of this load which is susceptible to
demand response mechanisms (i.e., the elastic load) needs
to be modelled for each section i (shown as the green parts
of the load histograms in Fig. 3). While this is not intended
by the CIM elements, we can use the LoadModel elements
to model this type of load. We denote the elastic load as a
function of day and time as Eipt; dq.
Furthermore, we model the available backup power of the
backup substation Bpt; dq for each time of the day t for a
given day type d with the LoadModel elements (blue in
the load histograms in Fig. 3).
C. Deriving the Model Parameters
From a CIM model that corresponds to the previous
subsection, we can derive the dependent variables of the
survivability model presented in Table I as follows. Let D
be the distribution circuit with n sections, simplified denoted
as D  t1; :::; nu. For a section i P D, we denote all
upstream sections by upiq: upiq  tj P D |j ¡ iu. We derive
the model parameters for a fixed day type d and a section that
fails i, i.e. we derive the parameters pi, i (both independent
of the day type), qpi; dq, and rpi; dq. The model can be
solved for every section in a circuit to obtain the average
AENS metric if any section fails.
Communication p: Assuming that the CIM model has
been annotated with reliability information (e.g., as derived
from detailed communication simulation), we can derive the
communication availability as follows. By fpcq, we denote
the probability that a single CommunicationLink c in
the set of all communication links C of the circuit has
failed at any point in time. It is the number of failures per
year (momFailureRate) times the length of each failure
(mTTR) divided by the number of hours in a year:
fpcq  momFailureRatec mTTRc
365  24
In our simple model, if a section i fails, the two Communi-
cationLinks ci and ci 1 connected to the two Breakers
bi and bi 1 need to be operational to successfully assess the
situation. Then, the probability that the required Commu-
nicationLinks for assessing the failure of section i are
available is the product of the probabilities that the adjacent
communication links are available:
ppiq  p1 fpciqqp1 fpci 1qq
Note that in this work we assume that sections and the
required communication fail independently (i.e. they do not
fail due to common causes). If this is not the case (e.g.
because wireless senders are mounted on a power line pole
and thus are subject to the same weather conditions as the
line itself), a correlation factor has to be added, which is
subject to future work.
Backup energy sufficient q: For a given section i that
fails at a given time of the day t on a day type d, the total
load Ti requested by the upstream sections upiq is
Tipt; dq 
¸
jPupiq
Ljpt; dq
Then, the backup power B is sufficient if the total
requested load is lower than the backup power:
qpi; t; dq 
"
1 if T pi; t; dq ¤ Bpt; dq
0 else
Then, if the load information is provided per hour, the
probability that the backup power is sufficient at any time
of the day of day type d is
qpi; dq  1
24
¸
0¤t 24
qpi; t; dq
Demand response effective r: The load that can be
reduced using demand-response mechanisms can be analo-
gously derived from the data. For each section, the orange
parts of the histograms in Fig. 3 represent this fixed load:
It is obtained by subtracting the elastic load E, i.e. the load
amendable to demand response, from the total load T . Thus,
the fixed load of all subsections upstream of a failed section
i is
Fipt; dq  Tipt; dq 
¸
jPupiq
Ejpt; dq
Demand response is only needed if the total load is higher
that the backup power. In that case, demand response is
effective if the fixed load is lower than the backup power:
rpi; t; dq 
$&% undef if qpi; t; dq  11 if qpi; t; dq  0^ Fipt; dq ¤ Bpt; dq
0 otherwise
Let Hpj; dq denote the hours in which backup power is not
sufficient if section j fails:
Hpj; dq  tt P 0; :::; 24 |qpj; t; dq  0u
The probability that demand response is effective at any time
during the day given that backup power is not sufficient is
rpi; dq  1|Hpi; dq|
¸
tPHpi;dq
rpi; t; dq
Communication repair rate : The average time
needed to restore failed communication can be derived
from the CIM mTTR attribute of a ReliabilityInfo
as follows. The average time needed to restore failed com-
munication if section i fails, denoted i, is the average of
the mean time to repair of the two adjacent communication
links ci and ci 1. Let mTTRc denote the repair rate of
communication link c. Then,
i  1
2
pmTTRci  mTTRci 1q
State reward rates: Energy not supplied: The energy
not supplied per hour (ENS/h in kilowatt, short ENSh
in formulas) in each of the system states (simplified here
compared to [3]) can be derived as follows. After a failure
(state 1), energy is only supplied to the sections downstream
of the failed section i. Let dpiq denote the downstream
sections dpiq  tj P D |j   iu. Thus, the energy supplied in
these state is the total load of the the failed section (Li) and
the total load of the upstream sections (Ti) averaged over
the day:
ENSh1pi; dq  1
24
¸
0¤t 24
Lipt; dq   1
24
¸
0¤t 24
Tipt; dq
If demand response is called for (state 2), the energy demand
has been lowered to the fixed load F of the upstream
sections, so that the energy not supplied is reduced to
ENSh2pi; dq  1
24
¸
0¤t 24
Lipt; dq   1
24
¸
0¤t 24
Fipt; dq
Eventually, energy is supplied to all sections except the
failed section (state 3), resulting in
ENSh3pi; dq  1
24
¸
0¤t 24
Lipt; dq
Table II
AVERAGE TOTAL LOAD L, AVERAGE ELASTIC LOAD E IN THE BASE
MODEL, AVERAGE ELASTIC LOAD E WHEN IMPLEMENTING OPTION 3
Section i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ILi 49.5 54.8 12 23.22 47.8 142.25 27.4 178.4 6.9
IEi base 2.04 0 4.07 11.59 0 15.28 0 0 1.45
IEi opt. 3 9.16 0 5.26 13.33 0 34.32 0 0 2.27
V. CASE STUDY
This section presents the application of our method to
survivability analysis of an adaptation of a real-word distri-
bution circuit located in Virginia, USA. In addition to the
real topological information and the real load information
from [11], we estimated failure rates and demand response
behaviour. Section V-A describes the CIM model we created
for analyzing the survivability of this distribution circuit and
the investment options engineers want to consider. Then,
Section V-B presents the survivability analysis results.
A. CIM Model
Figure 3 shows a simplified view of the CIM model we
created for the described distribution circuit. We study
three investment options, which can be reflected in the CIM
as follows. Each option represents a class of design deci-
sions: Power topological changes, communication network
changes, and demand response mechanism changes.
Option 1 - install another breaker: A breaker can be in-
stalled to split the largest section 6, where several industrial
customers are connected to the distribution network. After
the split, the two ConformLoads are in separate sections
6a and 6b. How the load is distributed among the two
sections can be determined e.g. based on billing data. Here
we assume that both fixed an elastic load are split in the
ratio 0.55/0.45 for sections 6a/6b, respectively.
Option 2 - Improve communication reliability: A more
reliable communication technology could be used. Detailed
communication simulation can be used to assess different
communication technology. For this example, let us assume
that the failure rate of all communication can be decreased
by 50% by adding cell phone network commnication to all
breakers in the section, so that communication links are
redundant. In the CIM model, we reflect this by changing
the momFailureRate to half its value (another option
would be to add a second communication link model element
to each breaker with a separate reliability annotation, and
extending our derivation of p to consider redundant links).
Option 3 - Increase available elastic load: The conversion
of 15% of the fixed load into elastic load can be modelled
by updating the ConformLoad model elements as shown
in Table II. Note that some sections do not support demand
response, e.g. because they power a hospital (section 8).
These sections are not updated and have 0 elastic load.
The input parameters to the survivability analysis are de-
rived as described in Section IV-C. The resulting parameters
for the three options are shown in Table III.
Table III
INPUT PARAMETERS FOR SURVIVABILITY MODEL
base model option 1 option 2 option 3
i p q r p q p r
1 0.933 0 0.042 0.933 0 0.966 0.167
2 0.933 0 0.167 0.933 0 0.966 0.250
3 0.922 0.042 0.130 0.922 0.042 0.960 0.261
4 0.922 0.125 0.048 0.922 0.125 0.960 0.286
5 0.922 0.292 0.471 0.922 0.292 0.960 0.941
6 0.911 1 NA 0.911 1 0.955 NA
6b 0.911 1
7 0.922 1 NA 0.922 1 0.960 NA
8 0.922 1 NA 0.922 1 0.960 NA
9 0.911 1 NA 0.911 1 0.911 NA
I 0.922 0.495 0.171 0.921 0.546 0.960 0.381
-0.12% 10.19% 4.21% 122.23%
Table IV
RESULTING AVERAGE ACCUMULATED ENERGY NOT SUPPLIED UP TO
FULL SYSTEM RECOVERY FOR THE INVESTMENT OPTIONS
I AAENS Improvement
base model 481.4 KWh
option 1 435.9 KWh -9.44%
option 2 474.4 KWh -1.46%
option 3 371.8 KWh -22.76%
B. Analyses
To assess the investment options, we assume that sections
fail with equal probability, so that we can aggregate the
survivability measures over which section fails. Furthermore,
we assume a fixed day type d describing an average day.
Then, we calculate the average AENS (“accumulated energy
not supplied up to full system recovery) given that any
section fails, denotes AAENS. Table IV shows the resulting
AAENS for the base model and the three investment options.
The base model has an AAENS of 481.4 KWh if any
section fails. If we implement option 1 (split section 6 into
two new sections), we can reduce the AAENS by 9.44% to
435.9 KWh. Improving the communication reliability leads
to a reduction of the AAENS by 1.46%. Finally, the most
improvement is achieved by increasing the available elastic
load, here the AAENS can be reduced by 22.76% to 371.8
KWh. As a result, engineers can choose to implement option
3 to improve the circuit’s availability if the costs of option
3 are not too high compared to the costs of option 1.
In addition to the analysis shown here, engineers may as
well study the combination of several investment options.
Automated design space exploration as described in [5] for
software architecture models could be extended to operate
on CIM models and automatically determine the best trade-
off with respect to several metrics such as a survivability
measure and costs.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly discuss related uses of the CIM
for power network analyses.
Several approaches use the CIM as a common model
to combine several traditional power system analyses. For
example, Uslar et al. [9] propose the application of the
CIM for the interoperability of different energy manage-
ment subsystems. They discuss how load forecast, dispo-
sition management, and net simulation can be integrated
by feeding results from one into the other. However, the
CIM here serves as a data exchange format only and is
not the modelling formalism based on which cross-cutting
design decisions are made. As an example from the smart
distribution network area, Vukmirovic et al. [10] present
a CIM-based integration of smart meter data management
with control centres, translating messages from smart meters
into CIM for use in different control centre applications.
However, in both examples the CIM is used as a data
exchange format to achieve interoperability and exchange
messages, not to store the power system model itself.
McMorran et al. [6] describe a power systems analysis
framework based on CIM as the core model. Their work
focusses on the technical implementation of such a core
model, discussing the storage of the inevitably large object
models and how to support possible extensions of the CIM.
In this paper, we focus on the use of a CIM in a framework
for the power engineer, its ability to integrate several analysis
approaches each focussed on specific power system aspects.
Moreover, we sketch how design decisions are supported by
this framework. Thus, their solution could be used in our
approach as part of the framework responsible for storage
of the CIM model instances.
Although the CIM is recognized to have great importance
for smart networks due to the interoperability it enables [7],
to the best of our knowledge, it has not been applied to
survivability analysis of smart distribution networks before.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a scalable CIM-based
common model-driven analysis framework for future smart
distribution networks, enabling power engineers to assess
design decisions. In particular, we have presented a mapping
from CIM to a holistic survivability analysis which allows to
predict the survivability of a distribution circuit with respect
to power equipment failures, communication failures, and
demand response applications.
In a case study based on a real distribution circuit, we
showed how our approach can be used to support engineers
to make investment decisions, without requiring them to
have detailed knowledge about the underlying analysis mod-
els. When realized in a tool, our approach will provide the
power engineers with an immediate-feedback tool to assess
smart distribution network.
In future research, we plan to implement the proposed
common analysis framework, to describe transformation and
feedback to detailed analysis models, such as communi-
cation simulation, thus to realize the scalable multi-level
survivability analysis. Furthermore, we plan to apply our
framework to other quality attributes of the smart distribution
network. In particular, cost modelling will be a valuable
decisions to assess cost-benefit of design options. Finally,
we will research how the very rich CIM model can be
efficiently shown to and edited by engineers by providing
different views on the CIM.
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